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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH
(West Jordan City),
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BRUCE S. ROBERTSON,

Case No. 930728-CA
Prioritv No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a first degree or capital felony.
Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1993).

Utah Code

This Court granted

Mr. Robertson's petition for interlocutory review on December 22,
1993.

A copy of the order granting interlocutory review is

contained in Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
West Jordan City originally cited Defendant Bruce S.
Robertson with violations of city ordinances and charged him in the
Justice Court with violations of such ordinances.

R. 50, 170. The

city prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice in the
Justice Court, then filed the Information in the Circuit Court.
Information filed in Circuit Court contained four charges:

The

Driving

Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in violation

of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Repl. 1993); Driving on a Revoked
License, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-2-136(3) (Repl. 1993); Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-136(3) (Repl. 1993); and
Fleeing from an Officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Repl. 1993).
Mr. Robertson moved to dismiss all four charges and filed a
supporting memorandum, claiming that Article VIII, Section 16 of the
Utah Constitution precluded the city from prosecuting the charges.
R. 26-33, 34. A copy of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is contained
in Addendum B.

Following a hearing on July 19, 1993, the trial

judge denied Defendants Motion to Dismiss.

R. 98-103, 169-176.

The trial court issued its written "Order Denying Defendant#s Motion
to Dismiss and Upholding Constitutionality of Statute" on
November 1, 1991.

A copy of that order is contained in Addendum C.

Mr. Robertson also filed a "Motion to Suppress Custodial
Statements" (R. 38-9), a "Motion in Limine to Suppress Evidence of
Prior Convictions" (R. 40), and a "Motion to Suppress Illegal
Warrantless Search" (R. 36-7).

The trial court has not yet heard

these motions.
Following the trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion to
Dismiss, this court granted Defendant's petition for interlocutory
review.

R. 109.
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TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) states:
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney
may prosecute violations of city ordinances, and
under state law, infractions and misdemeanors
occurring within the boundaries of the
municipality and has the same powers in respect
to the violations as are exercised by a county
attorney including, but not limited to, granting
immunity to witnesses. The city attorney shall
represent the interests of the state or the
municipality in the appeal of any matter
prosecuted in any trial court by the city
attorney.
The former version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp.
1990) states:
(1) The city attorney may prosecute
violations of city ordinances and has the same
powers in respect to violations of city
ordinances as are exercised by a county attorney
in respect to violations of state law, including,
but not limited to, granting immunity to
witnesses for violations of city ordinances.
(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a
deputy public prosecutor by the attorney general,
the county attorney of the county in which the
city is situated, or any other public prosecutor
having jurisdiction within the city limits.
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be
for a period of time as specified at the time of
oath taking but shall not exceed one year and
shall be subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the
city attorney may prosecute, in the name of the
state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated
as such by the Legislature and committed within
the territorial limits of the city.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(a) (Supp. 1993) states in
pertinent part:
In each county which is not within a prosecution
district, the county attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:

- 3
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(a) conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within the county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney under
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them.
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution states:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of
public prosecutors who shall have primary
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah
and shall perform such other duties as may be
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be
elected in the manner provided by statute and
shall be admitted to practice law in Utah.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Does the provision of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Repl. 1992)
which states that unelected city attorneys may prosecute misdemeanors
and infractions violate Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah
Constitution?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question
of law; thus, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusion for
correctness.

State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts giving rise to the criminal charges are not
relevant to the issue raised in this case.
taken regarding the underlying facts.

- 4

No evidence has been

As set forth in the Statement of the Case, West Jordan City
filed an Information in April 1993 charging Bruce Robertson with
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Repl. 1993); Driving on a
Revoked License, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-136(3) (Repl. 1993); Reckless Driving, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-136(3) (Repl.
1993) ; and Fleeing from an Officer, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Repl. 1993).
Mr. Robertson moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that
the unelected West Jordan City prosecutor could not prosecute
misdemeanors pursuant to Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah
Constitution.

R. 34.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp.
1992) violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution.
The statute permits an unelected city attorney to prosecute state
misdemeanors despite the constitutional requirement that an elected
public prosecutor have primary responsibility for prosecuting state
crimes.

The grant of authority to city attorneys transfers the

elected prosecutor's responsibilities to an appointed individual
whose actions are not overseen by an elected public prosecutor, in
violation of Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution.
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ARGUMENT
POINT. PROSECUTION OF STATE MISDEMEANOR CHARGES BY
AN UNELECTED CITY PROSECUTOR VIOLATES ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 16 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
In the present case, the unelected West Jordan City
prosecutor filed State class A and class B misdemeanor charges
against Appellant/Defendant Bruce Robertson.

R. 1-2.

The trial

court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) gave the
West Jordan City prosecutor the ability to prosecute State
misdemeanors.

The trial judge also concluded that Utah Code Ann.

§ 10-3-928 did not violate Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah
Constitution.

R. 98-103; see Addendum C.

Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution requires:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of
public prosecutors who shall have primary
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal
actions brought in the name of the state of Utah
and shall perform such other duties as may be
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be
elected in a manner provided by statute, and
shall be admitted to the practice of law.
(emphasis added)•
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) states:
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney
may prosecute violations of city ordinances, and
under state law, infractions and misdemeanors
occurring within the boundaries of the
municipality and has the same powers in respect
to the violations as are exercised by a county
attorney, including, but not limited to, granting
immunity to witnesses.
(emphasis added).
A statute must be declared unconstitutional where a
reviewing court cannot reasonably interpret the language to fit
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within constitutional framework.

State v. Davis# 787 P.2d at 519;

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983).

While statutes are

given a presumption of validity, a statute must nevertheless be
stricken where it cannot be given a limiting construction which
passes constitutional muster.

See City of St. George v. Turner, 860

P.2d 929, 936 (Utah 1993) (an ordinance "may be unconstitutionally
overbroad unless it is construed narrowly to pass constitutional
muster.

[citations omitted]."); Id. (Zimmerman, J., dissenting)

(ordinance is unconstitutional since plain language cannot be
construed to make statute constitutional).
Despite the preference for construing a statute to fit
within constitutional guidelines, clear and unambiguous language
must be held to mean what it clearly expresses.

See Johnson v. Utah

State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988) ("A fundamental
principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language in
the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its
plain meaning); Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 46.01 (3d ed.
1943) .
In other words, the plain language of a statute or
constitutional provision controls.
P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989).

See Provo City v. Willden, 768

Courts are not free to "rewrite a

statute or ignore its plain language in order to reach a
constitutional construction."

City of Logan v. Huber, 786 P.2d

1372, 1377 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d
911, 912 (Utah 1974) (court cannot create a crime where plain and
unambiguous language of statute repealed prior statutes and
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abolished that crime).

Hence, where the plain language of a statute

violates a constitutional provision, the court must be declare the
statute unconstitutional.
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution requires
that elected public prosecutors have primary responsibility for
prosecuting state crimes.

The Utah Legislature has set up a system

of public prosecutors by establishing elected county attorneys and
an elected Attorney General.

See Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (Repl.

1993); Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (Supp. 1993).

The Legislature

vested prosecutorial authority in the Attorney General and gave the
Attorney General supervisory power over county attorneys.
Ann. § 67-5-1(5) (Supp. 1993).

Utah Code

This system fits within the

requirement of Article VIII, Section 16 that an elected public
prosecutor have primary responsibility for prosecuting state
crimes.

See generally State v. Winne, 189 N.W. 119, 120 (S.D. 1922)

(deputy state attorney can carry out duties of constitutionally
established state's attorney).
By contrast, no statute exists which gives the elected
Attorney General or county attorney supervisory power over the city
prosecutor.

A city attorney derives his or her power to prosecute

state misdemeanors from Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992).
That statute fails to make the city prosecutor accountable to an
elected public prosecutor (and ultimately the electorate) and
therefore violates the constitutional requirement that an elected
public prosecutor have primary responsibility.
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The former version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp.
1990) required that a city attorney "be sworn as a deputy public
prosecutor11 by the attorney general, the county attorney of the
county in which the city is situated, or any other public prosecutor
having jurisdiction within the city limits" in order to prosecute
state class A misdemeanors.
1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp.

This former requirement that the city attorney be sworn as a

deputy public prosecutor appears to have been an attempt to comply
with Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution.

The

requirement that the city attorney be sworn as a deputy public
prosecutor is not included in the current version of the statute.
The trial court relied on Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (Supp.
1993) in support of its conclusion that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 is
constitutional.

R. 100-101; see Addendum C.

Contrary to the trial

court's conclusion, a review of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 further
demonstrates the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann § 10-3-928.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(a) (Supp. 1993) states in pertinent part:
In each county which is not within a prosecution
district, the county attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within the county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney under
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them.
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (Supp. 1993), when
read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992),
appears to give city attorneys primary authority for prosecuting
misdemeanors and infractions under the state code.
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The language

suggests that the elected county attorney can prosecute only when a
city declines to prosecute a misdemeanor or infraction.

It also

suggests that a city attorney is free to prosecute any misdemeanor
regardless of whether the elected public prosecutor determines that
the crime should be charged.

Giving such uncontrolled discretion

and primary responsibility to a city attorney invades and undermines
the constitutionally mandated authority given elected prosecutors.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutors
exercise discretion in deciding whether to file charges and, if so,
the nature of the charges to be filed.
402-3 (Utah 1989).

State v. Bellf 785 P.2d 390,

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) passes

this discretion to unelected city attorneys who are not accountable
to the electorate but who might be susceptible to pressures from
mayors or city council people.

The statute effectively removes

geographic areas from the elected public prosecutor's jurisdiction.
This ability of city prosecutors to exercise discretion without
accountability to the electorate coupled with the removal of cities
from the public prosecutor's constitutionally mandated
responsibilities underscores the unconstitutionality of this statute.
The trial judge interpreted the "primary responsibility"
language of Article VIII, Section 16 to mean that elected
prosecutors have "the first, the principal, the chief or leading
responsibility of prosecutors to prosecute criminal actions."
R. 102.

The trial court concluded, however, that such

responsibility is not exclusive.

According to the trial court,

Article VIII, Section 16 "does not preclude the legislature" from

- 10 -

giving appointed city prosecutors "limited responsibility in
prosecution."

R. 102.

As previously outlined, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-928 and
17-8-1 appear to give the city attorneys initial or primary
discretion as to whether to prosecute state misdemeanors and
infractions, in violation of Article VIII, Section 16.

In addition,

"primary responsibility" does not mean "first crack" at the
prosecution.

Instead, it means chief or principal control or

authority over the prosecution.1

This necessarily includes the

authority to oversee all state prosecutions.

Hence, Article VIII,

Section 16 requires that the elected prosecutor have the authority
to oversee all state prosecutions, not that it have the "first
crack" at filing.
The Utah Attorney General's Office issued an Informal
Opinion No. 92-16 on December 4, 1992 addressing the issue raised in
this case.

R. 16-22; see Addendum D for a copy of that letter.

The

Attorney General concluded that
. . . § 10-3-928 which purports to empower city
attorneys, who are not elected prosecutors, to
prosecute state criminal actions, and to do so
without being responsible to any elected
prosecutor concerning such state criminal
actions, violates the Utah constitution.
R. 22.

1. Webster's Dictionary, 1211 (2d ed. 1976, 1974) defines
"responsibility" as "accountability" or "a thing . . . for [which]
one is responsible." "Responsible" is defined as "accountable,"
"answerable." Webster's Dictionary, 1129 (2d ed. 1976, 1974)
defines "primary" as "chief" or "principal."
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The Informal Opinion letter points out further:
The problem with section 10-3-928 is that it
gives broad general authority to city attorneys
who are appointed rather than elected (Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-902) to exercise the powers of public
prosecutors by prosecuting infractions and
misdemeanors under state law; that is,
prosecuting in the name of the State of Utah.
Thus, under Section 10-3-928, a city attorney
derives the power to prosecute state offenses
directly from the statute, rather than by being a
delegee of, and under the supervision of, a
public prosecutor.
R. 18.
An additional problem is that "the statute grants
prosecutorial authority to a city attorney whether or not the county
attorney consents."

R. 18. Hence, city attorneys prosecuting state

misdemeanors are not under the supervision or control of elected
public prosecutors, as required by Article VIII, Section 16.
A number of jurisdictions have reached the conclusion that
similar constitutional provisions require that an elected official
oversee the activity.

See Informal Opinion letter at R. 18-20

citing cases from other jurisdictions.

In Ex parte Corliss, 114

N.W. 962 (N.D. 1907), the court held "that the legislature could not
deprive a constitutional officer of the power and functions
conferred by the Constitution and vest them in an officer of its own
creation."

Winne, 189 N.W. at 120.

In Corliss, the court struck

down the legislatively created position of "enforcement
commissioner."

The Corliss court pointed out that the state

constitution required that the activity delegated to the enforcement

- 12 -

commissioner be conducted by an elected official.

In striking the

legislation, the court reasoned:
If these constitutional offices can be stripped
of a portion of the inherent functions thereof,
they can be stripped of all such functions, and
the same can be vested in newly created
appointive officers, and the will of the framers
of the Constitution thereby thwarted.
Corliss, 114 N.W. at 964.
In Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 844 (Md. Ct. App. 1975),
the court determined that "the office of the state's attorney is a
constitutional office" and that the legislature could not dilute or
abrogate those powers.

See also In re House of Representatives, 575

A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990) (transfer of power from constitutionally
established elected Attorney General to public prosecutor violates
state constitution); State Board of Dental Examiners v. Brickham,
203 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. 1947) (constitutional authority of county
or district attorney to represent state in trial courts cannot be
abridged or taken away; no other person may represent state "unless
such officer joins therein"); City of Baton Rouge v. Short, 345
So.2d 37, 40 (La. 1977) (statute which allows city prosecutor to
pursue driving while intoxicated charges violates state
constitutional provision which "vests the district attorney or his
designated assistance with the exclusive charge of every criminal
prosecution by the state").
In contrast with a city attorney, the actions of a deputy
state's attorney do not violate the constitutional requirement that
an elected prosecutor pursue criminal prosecutions.

- 13 -

Winne, 189 N.W.

at 120. A deputy state's attorney is supervised by an elected
official and his acts are those of the elected prosecutor.
A deputy state's attorney does not fill a new
office created by statute, and is not endowed
with functions usurped from those of the
constitutional officer. His acts are those of
the constitutional officer . . . .
Wirme, 189 N.W. at 120.

See also People v. Kessler, 183 N.Y.S.2d

834, 835 (N.Y. 1959) (District Attorney can delegate his authority
to prosecute "although he may assume full and complete control of
same at any time he deems it advisable").

Hence, the attorney

general or county attorney can employ deputies without running afoul
of Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution.
Because city attorneys are neither elected nor supervised
by elected public prosecutors, they cannot prosecute state criminal
charges without violating the Utah Constitution.

In this case,

where a city prosecutor has filed state misdemeanor charges against
Mr. Robertson, the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the
charges.2

2. West Jordan City claimed in the trial court that Mr. Robertson
did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-928 because he had not shown "how he specifically
will be Adversely affected.'" R. 74. In Provo City v. Willden,
768 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share
with federal courts is the basic requirement that
the complainant show "'some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake
in 'the outcome of the legal dispute.'"
[citations omitted].
See also Davis, 787 P.2d at 524 (parties' rights must be
"specifically affected" in order to have standing to challenge a
statute).
(continued)
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial judge's order denying his Motion to Dismiss.

SUBMITTED this JIS4L day of May, 1994.

^ta^c.idm
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

\&k <£&
SUSAN M. DENHARDT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

(footnote 2 continued)
Mr. Robertson's rights are directly affected by the city's
prosecution of this case. In the event this Court concludes that
the charges should be dismissed, the prosecution against
Mr. Robertson will end. Hence, he has a personal stake in this
dispute.
Many cases holding that a state constitutional provision
precludes an unelected prosecutor from prosecuting state charges
arose in similar criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Winne, 189 N.W.
at 119 (defendant in criminal case moved for arrest of judgment,
claiming f,the information was invalid, and the court was without
jurisdiction to try the accused"); City of Baton Rouge v. Short, 345
So.2d at 38 (defendant objected to prosecution by city attorney,
claiming that state constitution "vests district attorney with
exclusive charge of every criminal prosecution by the state");
People v. Kesslerf 183 N.Y.S.2d at 835 (defendant appealed
conviction, claiming that information should be dismissed). The
issue of whether the city could file the information in this case
goes to the heart of the trial court's jurisdiction over this
matter. Hence, Mr. Robertson has standing to raise this issue.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff a n d Appellee,
v.
Bruce s. Robertson,

?

—
ORDER

'^ZfC^Oz.
«/• "••=•/r7'••••

Case No. 930728-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court on a petition.for
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. All
proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time
required, for appeals from final judgments.
5(e).

Dated this 22nd day of December, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Utah R. App. P.

ADDENDUM B

1- rt-43
SUSAN M. DENHARDT, #5943
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN CITY DEPARTMENT
WEST JORDAN CITY FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE BASIS
THAT WEST JORDAN CITY PROSECUTOR
LACKS AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE
MISDEMEANORS UNDER THE STATE
CODE

v.
BRUCE S. ROBERTSON,

Case No. 935003953TC
JUDGE EDWARD A. WATSON

Defendant.

Defendant, BRUCE S. ROBERTSON, by and through counsel,
SUSAN M. DENHARDT, hereby moves this court to dismiss the charges
of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Driving on a Revoked
License, Reckless Driving, and Fleeing from an Officer, filed
against Mr. Robertson. Defendant seeks this dismissal on the basis
that the West Jordan City Prosecutor, Greg Curtis, is prohibited
under

the

Utah

Constitution

Article

VII,

Section

prosecuting state code charges.
DATED this /9*- day of July, 1993.

t&irSte.

SUSAN M. DENHARDT
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM C

Greg J. Curtis (#4974)
West Jordan Assistant City Attorney
8000 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone: 569-5140
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN AND FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
(by West Jordan City)
:
Plaintiff,
:

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
UPHOLDING CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTE

vs
BRUCE S. ROBERTSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 935003953 TC
Judge Edward A. Watson

The Court finds that the defendant, Bruce S. Robertson,
was initially charged by citation in the West Jordan City Justice
Court with some infractions of law.
occurred
charges

within
were

These infractions of law

the West Jordan City

subsequently

dismissed,

limits.
without

The original
prejudice,

and

charges were brought, four in number, in the Third Circuit Court,
which are:

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation

of §41-6-44, a class "B" misdemeanor; Driving on Revocation in
violation

of

§41-2-136.3, a class

"B,f misdemeanor;

Driving in violation of §41-6-45, a class

Reckless

f,

B" misdemeanor; and

Fleeing from a Police Officer in violation of §41-6-13.5, a class
"A" misdemeanor.
1

The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss relying upon the
Utah Attorney General's Informal Opinion, No, 92-16, opining that
§10-3-928 of the Utah Code violated Article VIII, Section 16 of
the Utah Constitution in that §10-3-928 provides prosecutorial
authority

in

city

attorneys

who

are

not elected

under the

provisions of Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution.
The Court allowed both parties to submit written memorandum prior
to oral argument and after having considered the arguments and
memoranda of each party
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
The constitutional provision that applies to this case is
Article VIII, Section 16, which provides:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of
public prosecutors who shall have primary
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah
and shall perform such other duties as may be
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be
elected in a manner provided by statute, and shall
be admitted to practice law in Utah.
The city prosecutor bringing this action claims to have
authority provided to him under §10-3-928 of the Utah Code, which
states:
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney
may prosecute violations of city ordinances, and
under state law, infractions and misdemeanors
occurring within the boundaries of the municipality
and has the same powers in respect to the
violations as are exercised by a county attorney or
district attorney, including, but not limited to,
granting immunity to witnesses. The city attorney
shall represent the interests of the state or the
municipality in the appeal of any matter
prosecuted in any trial court by the city attorney.

2

This provision of the state code was amended in 1992. The
amendment deleted out a provision which provided for a system
whereby city attorneys could be deputized by county attorneys,
leaving only the section quoted by the Court.
The Legislature has also adopted a provision under §17-181 of the Utah Code which defines the powers and duties of county
attorneys.

Section 17-18-1, as amended in 1993,

provides, in

part:
In each county which is not within a prosecution
district, the county attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed within
the county, except for prosecutions undertaken by
the city attorney under Section 10-3-928 and
appeals from them;
In State v. Davis. 787 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah
Court

of

Appeals

reiterated

certain

rules

of

statutory

construction to use when there is a constitutional challenge to a
statute.

The Court of Appeals set down certain principles that

must be followed when determining the constitutionality of a
statute.

In recognizing

that it is the prerogative of the

Legislature to create the law, the Utah Court of Appeals and the
Utah Supreme Court have held that legislative enactments, such as
§10-3-928, have a presumption of validity.
presumes that §10-3-928 is valid.

The Court therefore

Utah appellate courts have

further held that the courts will not strike down a statute
unless
doubt.

it appears to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
The

reasonable

defendant

doubt

that

has

the

burden

§10-3-928
3

is

of

proving

beyond a

unconstitutional.

The

Supreme Court has further stated that it will not declare a
statute unconstitutional
reasonable

basis

to

if the statute can be found by any

be

brought

within

the

constitutional

framework.
The Court finds that there is the possibility of bringing
§10-3-928

within

validity

and

the

constitutional

constitutionality

to

framework
the

and

statute.

thus give
The system

established by the Legislature is a combination of city, county
and district

attorneys.

The question

is whether the system

provided for by the Legislature pursuant to the constitution is
valid.

Do

all

of

the

attorneys

in the prosecution

system

established by the Legislature have to be elected?
The position of the defense is that under whatever system
the Legislature provides public prosecutors have to be elected.
Thus prosecutors are in some way answerable, even though they
may be deputy attorneys, to an elected official.
The

Court

is

going

to

bring

§10-3-928

into

an

interpretation of constitutionality, and the framework of the
constitution,

by

interpreting

established in this state.
through enacting

the system the Legislature has

The Court finds that the Legislature

§10-3-928, as well as §17-18-1 and other

statutes where city attorneys have been allowed to prosecute
intended to exercise their constitutional directive to provide
for a system of public prosecutors.
statutory

provisions

which

included

The Legislature enacted
the

right

of

attorney to prosecute in certain limited situations.
4

the

city

The Constitution says the Legislature shall provide for a
system

of

public

responsibility

prosecutors

who

shall

have

primary

for the prosecution of criminal actions.

The

Court finds that primary responsibility does not mean exclusive
responsibility.

Primary responsibility can be interpreted to

mean, that it is the first, the principal, the chief or leading
responsibility of prosecutors to prosecute criminal actions. The
Court interprets Article VIII, Section 16, to mean that county
attorneys or the Attorney General, have primary responsibility,
meaning

the

full

gambit

of

criminal

prosecution.

County

attorneys or the Attorney General must be elected or deputized
attorneys of an elected prosecutor.
The Court finds that Article VIII, Section 16, does not
preclude the Legislature in giving and providing city attorneys,
who

are

not

entities,

elected

the

but

right

simply

to

have

appointed
limited

by

their

public

responsibility

in

prosecution.
The Court finds that the defense has failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that §10-3-928 of the Utah Code is
unconstitutional.
The Court finds that §10-3-928 is in fact constitutional,
the

Court

being

constitutional

able

framework

to

be
of

bring
the

§10-3-928

provisions

within
of

the

the
Utah

Constitution.
The motion to dismiss, as advanced by the defense is
denied.
5

Dated this

fJPb day of October, 1993.

Judge Edward A. Watson
Third Circuit Court Judge

Approved as to Form:

Susan M. Denhardt
Attorney for the Defendant
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ADDENDUM D

UhPICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF UTAH
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

December 4, 1992
Mr. David E. Yocom
Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Subject:

Informal Opinion No. 92-16
H.B. 436 - Authority of City Attorneys
To Prosecute Under State Law

Dear Mr. Yocom:
On behalf of the Advisory Board of the Statewide Association
of Prosecutors, you have asked our opinion concerning the
constitutionality of a portion of House Bill 436 (1991 General
Session) which amended Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 and which
statutorily authorized city attorneys to prosecute violations of
certain state laws occurring within the boundaries of their
municipalities.
Noting that city attorneys are not elected, you asked whether
this provision violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah
Constitution which provides that public prosecutors shall be
elected and shall have primary responsibility for the prosecution
of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of Utah. You
indicated that before the passage of H.B. 436, city attorneys had
been limited in their prosecution duties to prosecuting under city
ordinances or specific state statutes as provided by the
legislature, or under authority granted to them by deputization
from county attorneys.
Issues and Short Answers
PRIMARY ISSUE: Is the provision in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928
which authorizes city attorneys to prosecute crimes under state law
constitutional?
SHCRT ANSWER:

No.

236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801-538-1015 • FAX NO.: 801-538-1121

Opinion No. 9 2 - 1 6
Page 2
SECONDARY ISSUE: Are convictions which have been obtained by
city prosecutors pursuant to section 10-3-928 nevertheless valid?
SHORT ANSWER:

Yes.
Analysis

As amended, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 reads:
Attorney duties —

Deputy public prosecutor

In cities with a city attorney, the city
attorney may prosecute violations of city
ordinances, and under state law, infractions
and
misdemeanors
occurring
within
the
boundaries of the municipality and has the
same powers in respect to the violations as
are exercised by a county attorney, including,
but not limited to, granting immunity to
witnesses . . .
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution provides as
follows:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of
public prosecutors who shall
have
primary
responsibility
for the prosecution
of
criminal
actions
brought In the nam§ of the Staze of
Utah and shall perform such other duties as
may
be provided
by statute.
Public
prosecutors
shall
be elected
in a manner
provided by statute, and sh^ll be admitted to
practice law in Utah... [emphasis added.]
The Constitution thus provides that public prosecutors shall
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of state criminal
actions, and that such prosecutors must be elected.
The
legislature has provided for such a system of elected public
prosecutors by establishing county attorneys, who are elected, and
by vesting prosecutorial authority in the Attorney General, who is
also elected.1

x

Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(5) vests the
supervisory powers over county attorneys
matters pertaining to the duties of their
such provision giving the Attorney General
over city attorneys.

Attorney General with
of the srate in all
offices. There is no
supervisory authority

Opinion No. 92 - 16
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Also, a deputy county attorney may act for the county
attorney, without violating the constitutional provision that
elected public prosecutors have primary responsibility,
as a county
attorney can always review a deputy's recommendation and substitute
the county attorney's own decision for that of the deputy- State
v. Winne, 189 N.W. 119, 120 (S.D. 1922) ("a deputy state's attorney
does not fill a new office created by statute, and is not endowed
with functions usurped from those of the constitutional officer.")
The problem with section 10-3-928 is that it gives broad
general authority to city attorneys who are appointed rather than
elected (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-902) to exercise the powers of
public prosecutors by prosecuting infractions and misdemeanors
under state
law} that is, prosecuting in the name of the State of
Utah. Thus, under section 10-3-928, a city attorney derives the
power to prosecute state offenses directly from the statute, rather
than by being a delegee of, and under the supervision of, a public
prosecutor.
Indeed, the statute grants prosecutorial authority to a city
attorney whether or not the county attorney consents. The city
attorney could decide to prosecute a person whom the county
attorney would not have prosecuted, or to grant immunity to one to
whom the county attorney would not have granted immunity, or to
prosecute as a misdemeanor a case that the county attorney would
have prosecuted as a felony. These types of decisions are the
essence of prosecutorial discretion. See 27 C.J.S. District and
Prosecuting Attorneys § 14(1). State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 402
(Utah 1989) (prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining
whether and in what manner to prosecute a case). Further, since
county attorneys are elected, the people have the authority to vote
the public prosecutor out of office should they be dissatisfied
with the decisions of the prosecutor.
In Ex Parte Corliss, 114 N.W. 962 (N.D. 1907), a state statute
created an appointed office of "enforcement commissioner" and
invested the commissioner with all of the common-law and statutory
powers of elected state's attorneys in the enforcement of state
liquor laws. The court found the stature unconstitutional, stating
that it "violates those provisions of our state Constitution by
which the people reserved the right to have the public functions
which are attempted to be conferred upon the officers created by
said act discharged by officers of their own selection." JEci. at
963. The court also stated that "if these constitutional offices
can be stripped of a portion of the inherent functions thereof,
they can be stripped of all such functions, and the same can be
vested in newly created appointive officers, and the will of the
framers of the Constitution thereby thwarted." .Id., at 964.
Numerous jurisdictions have followed the Corliss court's
rationale. For instance, in Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837 (Md.
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App. 1975), the court struck down a statute which created the
office of state prosecutor as an independent unit in the executive
branch because it constituted an invasion of the powers and duties
of the state's attorneys and the Attorney General, in violation of
the Maryland Constitution.
The Maryland court enunciated the principle that "if an office
is created in the Constitution, and specific powers are granted or
duties imposed by the Constitution, . . . the position can neither
be abolished by statute nor reduced to impotence by the transfer of
duties characteristic of the office to another office created by
the legislature, [citations omitted] We regard this as but another
facet of the principle of separation of powers, guaranteed by [the
Maryland Constitution], jrd. at 846.
The court went on to state:
We do not find persuasive the contention that
the duties imposed on the Special Prosecutor
are concurrent with the powers of the State's
Attorneys.
The simple fact is that the
Special Prosecutor's power to initiate an
investigation and to commence prosecution is a
State's Attorney's most awesome discretionary
power:
to determine whether or not to
prosecute. . . • Praiseworthy through the
purpose of the General Assembly might have
been in enacting the legislation, the result
can
only
be
validly
achieved
by
a
constitutional amendment.
Id. at 848.
Similarly, in the case of In re House of Representatives, 575
A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined
that proposed legislation, which would have created a procedure for
appointing
a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute
certain crimes, violated that state's constitution by severely
infringing upon the fundamental constitutional powers of the
elected Attorney General. Id., at 179-180.
We find the authorities outlined above to be persuasive and
well-reasoned. Any person who prosecutes in the name of the State
of Utah must, according to the Utah Constitution, either be elected
or be responsible to a public prosecutor who is elected (that is,
responsible to one who has "primary responsibility" for the
prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of
Utah).
A city attorney prosecuting state criminal actions by
virtue of section 10-3-928 is neither an elected prosecutor nor
responsible to an elected prosecutor. Indeed, each prosecutorial
decision made by the non-elected city prosecutor diminishes the
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authority of the elected county attorney to decide otherwise.
Consequently, section 10-3-928, which purports to create the power
to prosecute under state law in a person who is neither elected nor
responsible to an elected prosecutor, violates the Utah
Constitution.
While city attorneys cannot derive power to prosecute in the
name of the State of Utah directly from statute, county attorneys
are empowered to deputize city attorneys to conduct such
prosecutions. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-111(2) provides
that a county attorney "may appoint city prosecutors as deputies to
prosecute state offenses in municipal justice courts." Therefore,
if a county attorney deputizes a city attorney, then the city
attorney derives the power to prosecute state offenses from the
county attorney, and is subordinate to and responsible to the
county attorney, an elected prosecutor.
Effect Upon Prior Convictions
The foregoing opinion raises the issue of what effect, if any,
the opinion may have upon prior convictions obtained by city
attorneys acting pursuant to section 10-3-928. We believe that any
determination that section 10-3-928 is unconstitutional would not
void any otherwise valid conviction.
In State v. Gambrell, 814 P. 2d 1136 (Utah App. 1991), the
defendant claimed that the County Attorney who prosecuted him never
filed a bond as required by statute, and that he was thus without
authority to initiate the charges, invalidating the trial court's
jurisdiction to hear the case.
The Utah Court of Appeals
disagreed, upholding defendant's conviction, stating:
"Under the de facto doctrine the acts of one
who assumes official authority and exercises
duties under color of a valid appointment or
election are valid where the community
acquiesces to his authority. The mere failure
to comply with a technical requirement does
not void the official's actions as to third
parties and the public. The acts are valid if
in the interests of justice."
Id. at 1139 (citations omitted).
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah App. 1991).

Accord, State v. Sawyers, 819

A city attorney prosecuting pursuant to section 10-3-928 would
have been acting "as one who assumes official authority and
exercises duties under color of a valid appointment where the
community acquiesces to his authority." Ibid. Further, in the
absence of section 10-3-928, the city attorneys could have been
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deputized by county attorneys to try cases in the name of the State
of Utah. Hence, the fact of not having been appointed by a county
prosecutor to try these cases can be viewed as a "mere technical
requirement which does not void the official's actions as to third
parties and the public." Ibid.
Third, the convictions obtained by the city attorneys are
clearly "in the interests of justice." We believe that Gambrell is
controlling in this instance, and that convictions obtained by city
attorneys while prosecuting in the name of the State of Utah would,
if otherwise valid, not be invalid due to having been obtained by
a city attorney.
Finally, case law from many other jurisdictions supports the
proposition that convictions are valid even though obtained by
prosecutors who may have had defective appointments.
In People v. Kemplev, 271 P. 478 (Cal. 1928), the court held
that special counsel for the state who assumed and exercised duties
of public officer under authorized appointment was an officer de
facto though not taking oath of office.
In People v. Montova, 616 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1980), the
defendant contended that his conviction was void because the case
was prosecuted by deputies of the Attorney General's Office whose
appointments as special prosecutors for the District Attorney were
invalid, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The
court held, however, that "even if ineligible as special
prosecutors, the members of the Attorney General's office acted as
de facto officers whose authority to prosecute [the defendant] may
not now be challenged." JCd. at 162. (citing Glavino v. People, 224
P. 225 (Colo. 1924).
In State v. Jaramillo, 749 P. 2d 1 (Idaho App. 1987), the
defendant challenged the validity of the appointment of the deputy
prosecuting attorney. The court held that under the authority of
Gasper v. District Court, 264 P.2d 679 (Idaho 1953) [which held,
inter alia, that where a duty or power is conferred by law on a
prosecuting attorney in this state, the same duty or power is
conferred upon his deputies], the prosecutor was, at the time
relevant to this case, at least a de facto
deputy prosecuting
attorney. In essence, the court said that if an appointment of the
deputy prosecuting attorney was not filed, he was at least a de
facto deputy prosecuting attorney.
In Grace v. State, 201 N.W. 338 (Neb. 1924), a county attorney
appointed a private attorney to undertake a prosecution, but the
assistant did not file a bond or take the official oath. The court
affirmed the conviction, stating that the assistant "held himself
out as county attorney and performed the duties pertaining to this
office and was recognized by the public as county attorney, so that
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he was county attorney de facto."

Jto. at 340.

In Pamanet v. State, 182 N.W.2d 459 (Wise. 1971), a district
attorney elected in one county served two counties. Though his
acts were arguably illegal as to the second county, the court held
that he was, at the very least, an officer de facto,
and even if
his acts were illegal as to the second county's electors, such acts
were still valid.
Conclusion
That portion of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 which purports to
empower city attorneys, who are not elected prosecutors, to
prosecute state criminal actions, and to do so without being
responsible to any elected prosecutor concerning such state
criminal actions, violates the Utah Constitution.
Notwithstanding the constitutional deficiency of the statute,
criminal convictions which have been obtained by city prosecutors
pursuant to section 10-3-928 are nevertheless valid.
Very truly yours,

MICHAEL D. WIMS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Enforcement Division

CREIGHTON C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Enforcement Division

